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In the Solvay conference (1927) Einstein argued against the quantum nonlocal decision at de-
tection on the basis of a simple single-particle experiment, but thereafter he withdrew towards the
more complicated 2-particle EPR argument. It has been claimed that Einstein was seeking for an
“epistemic interpretation”. In the light of a recent experiment [1, 2] I argue that Einstein missed
an important point: One cannot have conservation of energy without nonlocality at detection. This
experiment refutes also straightforwardly “epistemic” and “ontic” alternatives to quantum theory,
and shows that Einstein’s “epistemicism” entails “superdeterminism”.
Dedicated to Nicolas Gisin,
who has so much contributed to the insight
that quantum effects come from outside space-time,
on the occasion of his 60th birthday.
Introduction.—The analysis of Einstein’s attempts “to
clarify his views on quantum theory” has led Nicholas
Harrigan and Robert W. Spekkens to propose the hy-
pothesis that Einstein “was seeking not just any com-
pletion of quantum theory, but one wherein quantum
states are solely representative of our knowledge”, or us-
ing current wording, he was seeking for an “epistemic”
interpretation of the wave function. According to Harri-
gan and Spekkens their hypothesis is supported by “the
circumstance of his [Einstein’s] otherwise puzzling aban-
donment of an even simpler argument for incompleteness
from 1927” [3].
In contrast with the “epistemic” interpretations stand
the “ontic” ones assuming that the quantum states do
exist outside our minds. In the follow entities exist-
ing within space-time are referred to as “real”; and the
“wave function” is said to be “complete”, if no other ele-
ments are required to explain the outcome’s distributions
in experiments. In this sense, the de Broglie’s interpre-
tation (particle and “empty wave”) is “ontic”, assumes
that the quantum states are “real”, but does not consider
the “wave function” complete.[2]
In the light of the recent experimental demonstration
of nonlocal decision at detection [1, 2] and the Proceed-
ings of the Solvay conference 1927 [4], I argue here that
although Einstein was perfectly aware that the “collapse
of the wave function” involves nonlocality, he missed an
important point: One cannot have conservation of en-
ergy, that is “one photon one count” (photoelectric ef-
fect), without nonlocality at detection. This may have
been the reason Einstein missed “to clarify his views of
quantum theory” after all.
Nonetheless Harrigan and Spekkens’ hypothesis about
Einstein’s “epistemic” motivation holds as well: he not
only rejected quantum nonlocality and considered the
“wave function” incomplete, but renounced to endorse
FIG. 1: Einstein’s gedanken-experiment: Let S be a di-
aphragm provided with a small opening O, and P a hemi-
spherical photographic film of large radius. Electrons impinge
on S in the direction of the arrows. “There are de Broglie
waves, which impinge approximately normally on S and are
diffracted at O. Behind S there are spherical waves, which
reach the screen P and whose intensity at P is responsible
[massgebend] for what happens at P.” (See [4] p. 486: in the
text both ’P’ and ’S’ are confusedly referred to as “screen”
(e´cran)).
the “ontic” interpretation of de Broglie. I argue, how-
ever, that Einstein’s commitment to an “epistemic in-
terpretation” entails a “superdeterministic” explanation,
and this remains the very essence of “quantum epistemi-
cism” after him as well.
I conclude that the intrinsic relationship between non-
locality and conservation of energy [1, 2] allow us to refute
straightforwardly both, “epistemic” and “ontic” alterna-
tives to quantum theory: This theory is both “ontic”
and “complete”, although the quantum states cannot be
considered “real” and the theory can be improved.
Einstein 1927.—In the Solvay conference Einstein con-
sidered two possible Conceptions of the wave function in
the context of the gedanken-experiment in Figure 1:
Conception I: The wave function does not correspond
to a single electron, but to a cloud of electrons extended
in space. “According to this purely statistical point of
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2view, |ψ|2 expresses the probability that there exists at
the point considered a particular particle of the cloud,
for example at a given point on the screen.”
Conception II: The theory claims to be a complete the-
ory of individual processes and describe everything that
is governed by laws. According to this point of view,
“|ψ|2 expresses the probability that at a given instant
the same particle is present at a given point (for example
on the screen). (See [4] p. 486).
Einstein stresses that for reasons of coherence one has
to prefer Conception II (all information resulting from I,
results also by virtue of II, but the converse is not true;
and it is only by virtue of II that the conservations laws
are valid for the elementary processes –among other
reasons). But on the other hand Einstein has objections
to make to Conception II :
“If |ψ|2 were simply regarded as the probability that at a
certain point a given particle is found at a given time, it could
happen that the same elementary process produces an action
in two or several places on the screen. But the interpretation,
according to which |ψ|2 expresses the probability that this
particle is found at a given point, assumes an entirely peculiar
mechanism of action at a distance, which prevents the wave
continuously distributed in space from producing an action in
two places on the screen. In my opinion, one can remove this
objection only in the following way, that one does not describe
the process solely by the Schro¨dinger wave, but that at the
same time one localises the particle during the propagation. I
think that Mr de Broglie is right to search in this direction. If
one works solely with the Schro¨dinger waves, interpretation II
of |ψ|2 implies to my mind a contradiction with the postulate
of relativity.”[4]
In the light of this statement one cannot help thinking
that Einstein was a victim of “relativistic prejudice” and
overlooked the necessity of nonlocality for the conserva-
tion of energy and the photoelectric effect. Apparently
his primary intention was to oppose nonlocality. But on
the basis of the gedanken-experiment he proposed (Fig-
ure 1) nonlocality could not be questioned without ques-
tioning the conservation of energy at the same time:
It is well known that the idea of the “collapse” was
advanced to cope with interference experiments like the
sketched in Figure 2. If the decision happens at detection
and D(0) and D(1) are space-like separated, then nonlo-
cal coordination is required in order to ensure conserva-
tion of the energy in each single quantum event (that is,
avoid that sometimes both detectors fire together pro-
voking “one photon, two counts”, and sometimes none
of them fires, provoking “one photon, no count”). By
contrast assuming decision at the beam-splitter BS1 per-
mits to escape nonlocality in single-particle interference
experiments (Figure 2), but on the price of assuming
de Broglie’s “empty waves”, that is, entities propagating
within space-time that do not carry energy and momen-
FIG. 2: Interference experiment: Laser light of frequency ω
emitted by the source enters a Mach-Zehnder interferometer
through beam-splitter (half-silvered mirror) BS0 and gets de-
tected after leaving beam-splitter BS1. The light can reach
each of the detectors D(1) and D(0) by the paths l and s;
the path-length l can be changed by the experimenter. For
calculating the counting rates of each detector one must take
into account information about the two paths leading from
the laser source to the detector (wave behavior). However,
with a single-photon source only one of the two detectors
clicks: either D(1) or D(0) (particle behavior): “one photon,
one count”, or conservation of energy. If a ∈ {+1,−1} labels
the detection values according to whether D(1) or D(0) clicks,
the probability of getting a is given by P (a) = 1
2
(1 +a cos Φ),
where Φ = ωτ is the phase parameter and τ = l−s
c
the optical
path.
tum and are in principle inaccessible to observation.[2]
Apparently, a likely subconscious desire to fight nonlo-
cality without giving up the conservation of energy con-
trived Einstein to move from decision at detection to de-
cision at the beam-splitter. And the move brought about
the more complicated EPR argument.
The epistemic story.—Nonetheless, it is interesting to
note that in spite of EPR Einstein did not finish by en-
dorsing “empty waves” (“ghost fields”). His attitude can
be better understood if one puts it in relation to the two
following principles:
Principle A: All that is in space-time is accessible to
observation (except in case of space-like separation).
Principle Q : Not all that matters for physical phenom-
ena is contained in space-time.[5]
As it appears, Einstein was reluctant regarding Prin-
ciple Q (which is the very consequence of assuming non-
local decision at detection). But on the other hand he
did not dare to reject Principle A, and in fact he did not
acknowledge “empty waves” as “elements of reality”.
So Einstein’s “epistemicism” follows from his rejection
of de Broglie’s “ontic” interpretation (with decision at
the beam-splitter), and means three things: assumption
of (Principle A), adoption of decision at detection, and
obviously rejection of nonlocality. But then it is sheer
3impossible to maintain the conservation of energy, and so
the question arises: Which kind of “reality” underlying
the “wave function” was Einstein looking for after all?
The only possible answer is: “ontic states” (underly-
ing the quantum distributions) defined through accessible
variables in space-time. It is however easy to see, that
such an explanation implies straightforwardly “superde-
terminism”:
Consider the interference experiment sketched in Fig-
ure 2. Suppose that the quantum state entering the
beam-splitter BS0 emerges from an “ontic state” given
by certain accessible although hidden elements of reality.
Then the experimenter could access information about
which of the two paths (l or s) the particles takes af-
ter leaving BS0, and thwart the interference changing
the other path. This means that the view according to
which the quantum distributions “are solely representa-
tive of our knowledge” (Einstein’s “epistemic view”) ex-
cludes any free choice on the part of the experimenter.
What about “epistemicism” after Einstein?
It necessarily takes the option of “decision at detec-
tion”, otherwise it would reduce to de Broglie’s “ontic”
interpretation. Since if it were nonlocal, it would reduce
to the standard quantum mechanics, it has to be local.
But if it is local, it implies violation of the “conser-
vation of energy”. Hence one is led to assume that the
outcome is predetermined by the “ontic state” of the par-
ticle. This means in particular that the path the particle
takes after leaving BS0 is already predetermined before
the particle enters BS0, and so at the end (as we have
seen before) one is led to superdeterminism.
One could object that it is not necessary to assume
predetermination of the output port at BS0, but it suf-
fices to assume that the “ontic” state is unobservable in
principle, and the decision at BS0 (and generally at any
beam-splitter) happens according to some hidden ran-
dom variable inaccessible to the experimenter (indeed
this seems to be a main assumption of the PBR theorem
[8]). I give a threefold refutation to such an assumption:
- If the “ontic” state is unobservable in principle, then
“epistemicism” reduces to de Broglie’s “onticism”.
- By assuming free choice on the part of the exper-
imenter, one assumes brain outcomes “that cannot be
explained by any story in space-time”; this amount to ac-
cept Principle Q and then there is no reason to question
nonlocality and the completeness of quantum mechanics.
- Even if one assumes that at BS0 the outputport is de-
termined by an inaccessible random variable, the experi-
menter could impair the quantum interference by choos-
ing to change path l and/or path s at will after the par-
ticle leaves BS0. This is the argument used to rule out
the assumption that the particle travels either path l or
path s in the experiment of Figure 2, and to conclude
that for explaining interference one has to assume either
nonlocal decision or de Broglie’s “empty wave”, that is
get rid of “epistemicism”. (The PBR theorem [8] looks
like a complicate version of this argument).
In conclusion: “epistemicism” leads necessarily to “su-
perdeterminism”. And as far as one wishes to avoid the
latter one has to accept that there is no hidden reality
underlying the “wave function”.
Does this mean that the “wave function” itself is “real”
in the sense of an entity existing within space-time? Ob-
viously not. In the sense of Principle Q the wave function
does exist outside of our minds and it is not merely part
of our knowledge, and so far is “ontic”, but it does exist
outside space-time as well, and so far is not an “element
of reality”.
Niels Bohr thinking on this issue has been repeatedly
summarized through the famous quote: “There is no
quantum world. There is only an abstract physical de-
scription. It is wrong to think that the task of physics is
to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can
say about nature” I think that this quote is perfectly in
line with the two Principles A and Q. But independently
of whether this is the right interpretation of Bohr’s words,
I think one should take these two principles as distinctive
for quantum physics and more in general for science.
The ontic story.—It is interesting to go the other way
around, and also analyze how things evolved from the
perspective of the de Broglie’s “ontic” interpretation.
As it is well known, David Bohm added the “nonlocal
quantum potential” to the “local empty wave” to account
for the nonlocal correlations in 2-particle entanglement
experiments.[7] Thereafter two main developments hap-
pened leading to alternatives to quantum mechanics:
a) The “many worlds” interpretation attempting to re-
store locality. This interpretation denies both Principles
A and Q, and therefore is the consequent continuation
and fulfillment of the “empty wave” program. It is im-
portant to be aware of the fact that if one accepts deci-
sion at the beam-splitter and “empty waves” one rejects
(without realizing it) the Principles A and Q, and then
one will not be able to oppose “many worlds”.
b) Alternative theories that maintain nonlocality but
try to weaken it through some limits. There are three
testable models, which in fact have been extensively
tested in the context of two particle experiments [6]:
- Eberhard : assumes finite-speed causal influences
faster than light. Depending on the separation between
Alice and Bob, there are two different states: one defined
by a set of outcome pairs exhibiting nonlocal correlations
(i.e., a distribution violating Bell’s inequalities, also ar-
bitrarily large chained inequalities), and another defined
by a set of outcome pairs exhibiting local ones (fulfilling
Bell’s inequalities) (see [9, 11] and References therein).
- Suarez-Scarani : assumes relativistic time-ordered
nonlocal influences. Depending on whether Alice’s ap-
paratus and Bob’s one move relative to each other ac-
cording to the before-before relativistic timing, the model
assumes two different states like Eberhard’s model does
4(see [10, 11] and References therein).
- Leggett : entails that only part of the joint outcomes of
Alice and Bob (in a 2-particle experiment) are nonlocally
correlated; the rest of the joint outcomes exhibit only lo-
cal correlations, yielding non-trivial marginals. There is
a unique state defined by the union of the nonlocal set
of outcomes and the local one, and yielding a distribu-
tion that does not violate arbitrarily large chained Bell’s
inequalitites (see [12–14] and References therein).
All these three models deviate from quantum mechan-
ics because of the limits they impose to nonlocality.
Note that Leggett imposes a strong constraint to the
union of the local and nonlocal sets of outcomes, whereas
Eberhard and Suarez-Scarani impose none. Accordingly
the last two models are neither addressed by the Colbeck-
Renner’s theorem nor falsified by the corresponding ex-
periment in [14]. Therefore this experiment does not pro-
vide “a complete answer to the question [...] of whether
quantum mechanics is the optimal way to predict mea-
surement outcomes” (see [14] Abstract). Conversely, the
theorem established in [11] does not falsify Leggett-type
models. This means that establishing completeness of
quantum mechanics requires both results [14] and [11],
provided it would be possible to achieve completion as-
suming decision at the beam-splitters.
However, as stated before, assuming decision at the
beam-splitter amounts to accept “many worlds”, and
then one can neither incorporate the free choice of the
experimenter nor nonlocality into the theory. Invoking
freedom alone is not sufficient to oppose “many worlds”,
one has to reject decision at the beam-splitter as well,
and accept Principle A (space-time emerges from light
and is the domain of the visible things).[6]
Suppose now one tries to implement the “ontic” mod-
els under nonlocal decision at detection (which arguably
[2, 6] should be considered more basic than Bell’s non-
locality [7]). De Broglie-Bohm would obviously reduce
to standard quantum mechanics. As for the three mod-
els discussed previously, all of them predict uncoordi-
nated detections at D(1) and D(0), and hence are falsi-
fied straightforwardly by the experiment in [1, 2]. This
means that each detection outcome in a quantum experi-
ment is nonlocal, and quantum mechanics can be consid-
ered complete, although it is susceptible of improvement
(as argued in [6]).
Conclusion.—The experiment presented in [1, 2]
stresses that in the Solvay conference 1927 Einstein over-
looked the relevance of quantum nonlocality for the con-
servation of energy. So the experiment may contribute to
overcome the still widespread prejudice that “conserva-
tion of energy” is nothing important for the nonlocality
business. It can also help to see the Principles A and Q as
distinctive for quantum physics and science. In the light
of this experiment one can finally conclude that quantum
mechanics is “ontic” and “complete”, although the quan-
tum state is not “real” and the theory is improve-able.
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